From Experiment to Infrastructure: How COP30 Can Mainstream Carbon Removals

With COP30 taking place right now in Brazil, the imperative is clear: countries, companies and investors must treat durable removals not as a side-project but as a foundational pillar for managing residual emissions.

By Mariano Molina, VP, Government Affairs and Stakeholder Relations


When COP29 concluded in Baku in 2024, negotiators delivered the long-awaited rulebook for Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, including:

  • Article 6.2: Allowing countries to trade emissions reductions through bilateral agreements.
  • Article 6.4: An international carbon crediting mechanism with a Supervisory Body whose responsibilities include developing and agreeing methodologies, registering activities, and accrediting verification bodies.


For the carbon dioxide removal (CDR) sector, Baku marked more than a policy milestone; it signaled the moment when removals began to transition from optional experiments to essential climate infrastructure.


With COP30 taking place right now in Brazil, the imperative is clear: countries, companies and investors must treat durable removals not as a side-project but as a foundational pillar for managing residual emissions.


In this fast-developing space – and with the toll of climate change now felt worldwide – “cut only” scenarios are no longer sufficient when it comes to greenhouse gas emissions.


Post-COP29 Developments in CDRs


Since COP29, clearer international rules and growing political alignment are reshaping the carbon removals landscape:

  • Market frameworks are gaining clarity: Article 6 wraps up almost a decade of negotiations and finally provides a framework for so-called Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs), registries, authorization and accounting. For CDR-project developers and buyers, this reduces regulatory ambiguity, which is a prerequisite for delivering at the scale required to address climate change.
  • Removals are entering the conversation: Until recently, many frameworks emphasized emissions reductions. But Article 6.4 explicitly includes removals among eligible mitigation outcomes under the Paris framework. That acknowledgement shifts the equation and builds confidence. CDRs are no longer optional – they are integral.
  • Cross-border cooperation is emerging: A compelling example is the bilateral agreement signed in June 2025 by Norway and Switzerland under Article 6.2, the first of its kind to facilitate durable CDR transfers. Under this pilot agreement, ITMOs generated through CDR and geological carbon storage in Norway will be transferred to organizations in Switzerland. This agreement sends a powerful signal, showing countries beginning to cooperate to authorize, transact, and account for durable removals under Article 6.
  • Government-led initiatives: Aim to strengthen high-integrity, voluntary demand for carbon credits such as the Coalition to Grow Carbon Markets. Led by Kenya, Singapore and the UK, the coalition will be launched during COP30 outlining how the Shared Principles will be implemented, guiding the Coalition’s work through COP33 and charting a clear path to impact.


Early Signs of Momentum


This month, the UN officially opened its global carbon market, which has the potential to channel billions of dollars to carbon reduction and capture projects. We’re already seeing countries emphasizing the role the private sector will need to play to support implementation of Article 6.2 – for example, in quality assessment. 


Meanwhile, on November 7, Brazil, China and the EU launched the Open Coalition on Compliance Carbon Markets, an effort to harmonize carbon markets through shared standards. The coalition is urging other nations to consider compliance markets and carbon pricing as a viable way to cut emissions and fund climate investment.


Yet this momentum is in its infancy, and there’s work to be done. Many Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) underplay removal pathways; climate-finance flows remain heavily weighted towards reductions rather than balanced with durable removals; and scalable supply of high-integrity CDR is still nascent.


What COP30 Must Do


The agenda must move from mentioning removals to mainstreaming them. This includes:

  • Embedding CDR into the global stocktake and NDCs: The global stocktake is the moment when countries assess progress and set the next wave of ambition. According to the latest data, 118 countries have submitted their new NDCs, representing around 73% of global emissions – with 79 nations yet to submit their updated plans. According to the latest data, 118 countries have submitted their new NDCs, representing around 73% of global emissions – with 79 nations yet to submit their updated plans. The NDCs submitted so far have made a modest dent in the 2035 emissions gap, which still stands at nearly 28 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e) to keep warming to 1.5°C. It is clear that removals should feature in the NDCs more distinctly – not as add-ons but as strategic infrastructure. If that happens, governments can plan and finance removals alongside cuts, rather than after.
  • Mobilize public and blended finance for durable removal technologies: Policy momentum in the US tax-credit regime, such as 45Q, and from the EU’s emerging certification proposals for direct air capture and storage, biogenic emission capture and storage, and biochar carbon removal are positive steps. But at COP30 we need clear commitments for public and blended finance that de-risk durable removal investments. Buyers and developers need predictable pathways.
  • Nurture market signals for high-durability removals: Technologies such as bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) require verified permanence, transparency, and clear accounting rules. The Norway–Switzerland agreement shows what’s possible when countries enable credible trade and recognition of durable removals under Article 6. But to scale, markets must go further to better reward long-term offtakes, verified durability, and high-integrity performance.
  • Ensure access and capacity globally: To treat CDR as infrastructure means weaving it into all geographies, including countries with less established technology, finance and governance for durable removals. That means aligning removal deployment with sustainable-development outcomes, while supporting technology transfer, capacity building, and adherence to integrity safeguards under Article 6.


Why Buyers, Developers and Policymakers Should Care


For buyers pursuing high-integrity removals, thinking of CDR as infrastructure matters. Projects cannot remain short-term transactions; they must align with long-term climate and sustainability strategies, national climate plans and emerging frameworks. Developers require investment, scale and clarity – so policymakers must embed these as systems, not side-projects.


The Norway–Switzerland agreement is not just a pilot – it can act as a blueprint. It demonstrates how public-private coordination and credible transfer mechanisms can deliver durable removals aligned with national accounting.


We are at a pivotal moment. The regulatory architecture for cross-border carbon cooperation is in place, and we anticipate its expansion to drive up the quality of CDRs. The focus must now shift to scaling the market and deepening cooperation – between countries and across the public and private sector.


At this turning point, the question isn’t whether CDR deserves attention – it’s how we mainstream it to secure the permanence, scale and credibility needed to reach global net zero.


Last updated: 11.20.25